Open DID methods for real-world identity

Attestto develops and maintains two Decentralized Identifier methods — both on the W3C standards track, both with live resolvers, both open source.

These methods bridge existing trust infrastructure (national PKIs, domain name systems) into the DID ecosystem without replacing anything. Verifiers get interoperable resolution. Issuers keep their existing keys.

Two methods, one resolver

did:pki v0.1.0

Read-only DID method that deterministically derives DIDs from X.509 CA certificates in national Public Key Infrastructures. No registration, no on-chain writes — if a government CA exists, it already has a DID.

did:pki:cr:raiz-nacional Costa Rica Root CA
did:pki:cr:sinpe:persona-fisica SINPE end-user issuing CA
did:sns v0.4.0

Alias-anchored DID method using the Solana Name Service. Human-readable identifiers that resolve to DID Documents via on-chain lookup. Suitable for organizations, professionals, and any entity that wants a memorable, verifiable identifier.

did:sns:attestto Attestto organization
did:sns:fi-cr Costa Rica finance authority

Universal resolver

A unified HTTP endpoint resolving both did:pki and did:sns identifiers. Conforms to the DIF Universal Resolver interface.

GET https://resolver.attestto.com/1.0/identifiers/did:pki:cr:raiz-nacional

Returns a W3C DID Resolution Result with the CA's public key as JWK, certificate metadata, and PKI hierarchy information.

Why existing approaches don't scale

Over 100 countries operate sovereign PKI hierarchies for digital signatures. These hierarchies are islands — a certificate issued by Costa Rica's BCCR is unverifiable in Panama without custom tooling. The industry has tried several approaches, each with structural limitations.

Approach Depends on Neutrality Scales?
did:pki Mathematics (X.509 certificate) Full Automatic — add certs, get DIDs
Trusted Lists (eIDAS) Diplomatic agreements per country pair Medium Slow — requires treaties
Vendor programs (Adobe AATL) Private company's inclusion criteria None Easy — but you lose sovereignty
Bridge CAs (Federal Bridge) Central authority cross-signing Low Rigid — single point of political control
did:web / did:tdw DNS infrastructure + hosting Medium Easy — but domain dies, DID dies

did:pki takes a fundamentally different approach: deterministic derivation from the certificate itself. No registration, no agreements, no vendor dependency, no DNS reliance. If a government CA certificate exists, it already has a DID — any conformant resolver will derive the same identifier and return the same public key.

This is the technical fast lane: instead of waiting for diplomatic agreements to recognize trust lists, did:pki translates the trust that already exists in the certificate into a language that modern applications (wallets, verifiers, smart contracts) understand natively.

Real-world use cases

These aren't hypothetical. Each use case below is either live or in active development, using did:pki and/or did:sns for identity resolution and credential verification.

🏛

National PKI Bridge

Costa Rica's Firma Digital PKI hierarchy (BCCR/MICITT) mapped to did:pki. Every CA — root, policy, issuing — resolvable as a DID Document with its public key. Enables cross-border signature verification without bilateral agreements.

Live
📝

Document Signature Verification

PDF documents signed with national digital signatures (PKCS#7/CAdES) verified cryptographically in-browser. The verifier doesn't need to bundle every country's trust store — the resolver provides the CA public keys.

Live
⚕

Professional Credentials

Proposed framework for Verifiable Credentials for licensed professionals (doctors, lawyers, engineers). Professional identity anchored via did:sns, issuing authority verified via did:pki chain.

Proposed
🚗

Digital Driving Credentials

Proposed mobile driving license architecture following ISO 18013-5, with mastery-based continuous competency verification. Exam proctoring, decay scoring, and renewal gates — anchored to the holder's DID.

Proposed

PKI trust store

The did:pki resolver draws from the attestto-trust repository — an independent, open-source mirror of national PKI root and intermediate CA certificates. Adding a country means adding its certificates to the trust store.

🇨🇷 Costa Rica Live — BCCR/MICITT full hierarchy
🇪🇸 Spain Planned — FNMT certificates
🇧🇷 Brazil Planned — ICP-Brasil hierarchy
🇺🇸 United States Planned — Federal PKI

Want your country's PKI in the trust store? Reach out or submit a PR.

Ready to explore?

Browse the source code, read the specs, or try the live resolver.